Part III in the Futurist Findings series examining the Iran conflict and the collapse of the JCPOA framework.
Image: Razorfin Media / Futurist Findings © 2026
How international law, escalation dynamics, and the distributed structure of Iran’s military networks complicate the pursuit of regime-targeted conflict.
Wars often begin with the promise of precision. Political leaders describe limited objectives, targeted strikes, and rapid conclusions. History shows that once the use of force crosses certain thresholds, conflicts rarely remain contained. Military operations intended to remove leadership, disable strategic capabilities, or compel regime change frequently trigger wider dynamics that extend far beyond the initial plan. The current confrontation with Iran raises precisely these risks.
This article builds on earlier Futurist Findings analysis examining the collapse of the JCPOA nuclear agreement and the geopolitical escalation that followed. Part I examined the political decisions that dismantled a functioning deterrence framework. Part II explained the technical architecture of the agreement and why it successfully constrained nuclear escalation for years. Part III turns to the present conflict and examines the legal and strategic dynamics that shape how wars of this type unfold.
Understanding these dynamics requires examining both the legal framework governing the use of force and the operational structure of the actors involved. When conflicts intersect with distributed military networks and modern escalation dynamics, the outcomes are rarely as predictable as the political narratives that precede them.
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The Legal Guardrails Governing the Use of Force
The modern international legal framework governing war is rooted in the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) establishes the central rule that states must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.¹ This prohibition forms the legal backbone of the post-World War II international order.
The Charter recognizes only two narrow exceptions to this rule. The first occurs when the United Nations Security Council authorizes force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. The second exception is outlined in Article 51, which affirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member state.²
The right of self-defense is not unlimited. International law requires that defensive actions satisfy the principles of necessity and proportionality.³ Measures taken in self-defense must also be reported to the Security Council until that body assumes responsibility for the situation.² These conditions are intended to prevent unilateral wars while still allowing states to defend themselves when genuine attacks occur.
Debates surrounding modern military operations often center on how expansively the concept of self-defense should be interpreted. Some policymakers argue that emerging threats require broader doctrines of anticipatory defense. Others warn that expanding the definition of self-defense risks eroding the legal barriers that were designed to prevent aggressive war.⁴
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Targeted Killing and the Boundaries of Preemption
The legality of targeted killing or assassination in international relations has long been controversial. Traditional interpretations of international law treat the deliberate targeting of political leaders as incompatible with the prohibition on the use of force. Modern security doctrines have sometimes attempted to justify targeted killings under expanded interpretations of preemptive self-defense.⁵
The debate intensified following the expansion of preemption doctrines in the early twenty-first century. Scholars examining these developments warned that incorporating assassination into a doctrine of preemption raises profound legal and ethical questions about the limits of lawful force.⁵ If the threshold for self-defense becomes too elastic, the distinction between defensive action and unilateral aggression becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
The stability of the international legal system depends in part on maintaining that distinction. Once states begin to reinterpret the limits of lawful force too broadly, the guardrails designed to prevent conflict begin to weaken.
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Proportionality and the Escalation Threshold
Even when a state invokes the right of self-defense, international law requires that military responses remain proportionate to the threat being addressed. Proportionality refers not only to the scale of force used but also to whether the chosen methods are necessary to achieve legitimate defensive objectives.⁶
Evaluating proportionality has become increasingly complex as modern conflicts incorporate cyber operations, drone strikes, proxy actors, and hybrid forms of warfare.⁶ These complexities make it harder to determine when a response exceeds the bounds of legitimate defense.
Once large-scale military operations begin, the principle of proportionality can also become difficult to sustain. Military planners must respond to evolving threats, protect deployed forces, and maintain operational momentum. These pressures often expand the scope of a conflict beyond its original objectives.
Escalation theory suggests that wars frequently develop their own internal logic once violence passes certain thresholds.⁷
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Distributed Military Architecture
Understanding the strategic risks of the current confrontation requires examining the structure of Iran’s military system. Unlike highly centralized military hierarchies, Iran’s security architecture incorporates a combination of conventional forces, revolutionary guard units, regional proxy groups, and allied militias operating across multiple theaters.⁸
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains operational relationships with networks that extend well beyond Iran’s borders.⁸ These networks include regional militias and partner organizations capable of conducting operations independently of centralized command structures.
This distributed structure is designed to absorb shocks to the leadership or central command. Rather than relying on a single point of control, the system functions through layered networks that allow local actors to continue operating even if senior figures are removed.
Strategies focused primarily on leadership removal may therefore disrupt command structures temporarily without eliminating the broader operational capacity of the network.
Modern warfare increasingly reflects similar distributed dynamics. Drone warfare and networked military technologies allow smaller actors to project force across wide geographic areas while maintaining relatively low operational costs.⁹ As these technologies proliferate, the strategic advantage once held by centralized military powers becomes more difficult to sustain.
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Escalation Dynamics in Modern Conflict
The interaction between decentralized military networks and modern military technology creates a strategic environment in which conflicts can expand rapidly. Escalation theory suggests that once a conflict begins, each side adapts its strategy in response to the actions of the other.⁷
Retaliation, deterrence signaling, and alliance commitments can draw additional actors into the conflict. What begins as a limited operation can gradually widen into a multi-theater confrontation.
These dynamics are particularly dangerous when conflicts involve states that possess regional alliances, asymmetric capabilities, and the ability to operate through proxy actors. The distributed nature of these networks allows them to continue functioning even under intense military pressure.
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The Limits of Decapitation Strategy
History suggests that wars built on decapitation strategies rarely unfold as their architects expect. Removing or targeting senior leadership may disrupt command structures temporarily, but it does not dismantle distributed networks designed to survive such shocks. Iran’s military architecture, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its regional affiliates, operates through decentralized command structures, proxy actors, and transnational partnerships capable of continuing operations even under severe pressure.⁸
In systems organized this way, pressure on the center often disperses activity rather than eliminating it. What begins as a targeted campaign can therefore expand into a wider conflict as networks adapt, retaliate, and escalate across multiple theaters.
Escalation theory has long warned that once violence crosses certain thresholds, conflicts develop their own internal momentum.⁷ The legal guardrails of the international system exist precisely to prevent such spirals from beginning. When those guardrails fail, wars rarely remain contained.
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Notes
1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(4), 1945, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
2. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, art. 51, 1945, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
3. Vita Upeniece, “Legal Framework of the Use of Force in International Law,” Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference of Daugavpils University 59 (2017): 106–113.
4. Ben Hines, “Reinterpreting the Legality of Forcible Selfdefence in Response to Non-Kinetic Cyber Attacks,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 25, no. 1 (2024): 51–94.
5. Louis Rene Beres, “The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can It Include Assassination?” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 31, no. 2 (2002).
6. Clara Maathuis, “Agent-Based Model for Proportionality Assessment in Military Operations,” Proceedings of the European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (2025): 375–383.
7. Lisa J. Carlson, “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 511–534.
8. Farhad Rezaei, “Iran’s Military Capability: The Structure and Strength of Forces,” Insight Turkey 21, no. 4 (2019): 183–216.
9. Gerry Doyle and Aaron Kirchfeld, “As Drones Swarm Battlefields, Militaries Seek Cheaper Defenses,” Bloomberg, September 13, 2025.
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Sources
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. 1945. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
Beres, Louis Rene. “The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can It Include Assassination?” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 31, no. 2 (2002).
Carlson, Lisa J. “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 511–534.
Doyle, Gerry, and Aaron Kirchfeld. “As Drones Swarm Battlefields, Militaries Seek Cheaper Defenses.” Bloomberg, September 13, 2025.
Hines, Ben. “Reinterpreting the Legality of Forcible Selfdefence in Response to Non-Kinetic Cyber Attacks.” Melbourne Journal of International Law 25, no. 1 (2024): 51–94.
Maathuis, Clara. “Agent-Based Model for Proportionality Assessment in Military Operations.” Proceedings of the European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (2025): 375–383.
Rezaei, Farhad. “Iran’s Military Capability: The Structure and Strength of Forces.” Insight Turkey 21, no. 4 (2019): 183–216.
Upeniece, Vita. “Legal Framework of the Use of Force in International Law.” Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference of Daugavpils University 59 (2017): 106–113.
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