How the collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement dismantled the diplomatic guardrails that had constrained escalation.
Iran Conflict Analysis — Part II
Image: Razorfin Media / Futurist Findings © 2026
This analysis builds on the first article in this series, The War They Wanted.
The Guardrail That Held the Line
Some diplomatic agreements are designed to create peace. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was designed to prevent catastrophe.
When the JCPOA was signed in 2015, it represented one of the most ambitious arms-control frameworks ever negotiated. The agreement placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear program while establishing one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented.¹
For several years, the deal succeeded in its central objective: constraining Iran’s nuclear activities while reducing the risk of regional war. But the collapse of the agreement after the United States withdrew in 2018 dismantled the diplomatic guardrails that had kept tensions from escalating into open conflict.
Understanding what the JCPOA actually did, and what followed its collapse, is essential to understanding today’s confrontation with Iran.
What the JCPOA Actually Did
The JCPOA was designed around a simple principle: delay and detection.
Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by approximately 98 percent and cap enrichment levels well below weapons-grade thresholds.² The agreement also required Iran to dismantle thousands of centrifuges and redesign key nuclear facilities to prevent weapons-grade production.¹
Just as important as these limits was the inspection regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gained continuous monitoring access to uranium production facilities, centrifuge manufacturing sites, and enrichment plants.¹ Inspectors could track nuclear material across the entire fuel cycle, significantly reducing the possibility of covert weapons development.
The result was a nuclear program that remained technically capable but heavily constrained and internationally monitored.
This arrangement did not eliminate geopolitical tensions between Iran and its regional rivals, but it created a predictable framework in which those tensions could be managed without triggering a nuclear crisis.
The Collapse of the Agreement
In 2018 the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed sweeping economic sanctions under a policy described as “maximum pressure.”³
The strategy aimed to force Iran into renegotiating the agreement on terms more favorable to the United States and its regional allies. But instead of producing a new diplomatic framework, the withdrawal destabilized the existing one.
European governments attempted to preserve the agreement through mechanisms such as the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), which was designed to allow limited trade with Iran while bypassing U.S. sanctions.⁴ However, these efforts proved largely ineffective as companies and financial institutions avoided transactions that might trigger American penalties.
As economic pressure intensified, Iran began gradually abandoning the nuclear restrictions that had defined the agreement.
Uranium enrichment levels increased. Stockpile limits were exceeded. Advanced centrifuge research resumed.
The guardrails that had defined the JCPOA were steadily dismantled.
Escalation and Strategic Consequences
The collapse of the nuclear agreement did not occur in isolation. It unfolded alongside rising regional tensions, covert cyber operations, and expanding proxy conflicts across the Middle East.
Cyber operations have increasingly become part of modern geopolitical competition, with several major powers—including Iran—developing sophisticated state-sponsored hacking capabilities.⁵ These operations allow states to pursue strategic objectives below the threshold of conventional warfare while maintaining plausible deniability.
At the same time, military confrontations between Israel and Iranian-aligned forces intensified across multiple theaters. Analysts have argued that the weakening of diplomatic mechanisms such as the JCPOA removed important channels for de-escalation.³
Without those mechanisms, the risk of miscalculation increased.
In this sense, the nuclear agreement functioned less as a peace treaty than as a stabilizing structure—one that helped prevent localized conflicts from spiraling into broader war.
Public Opinion and the Risk of War
Despite escalating tensions, public support within the United States for a large-scale military confrontation with Iran has remained limited.
Multiple polls conducted during recent crises have shown that majorities of Americans oppose war with Iran without explicit congressional authorization.⁶ Other surveys have found widespread concern that military escalation in the region would make the United States less safe rather than more secure.⁷
These findings highlight a persistent gap between geopolitical strategy and public sentiment.
While policymakers debate military options and deterrence strategies, the American public has repeatedly expressed reluctance to enter another major Middle Eastern conflict.
Conclusion
The JCPOA was never intended to solve every political dispute between Iran and the West. Its purpose was narrower and more pragmatic: to slow nuclear proliferation and create time for diplomacy.
For several years it achieved that goal.
But when the agreement collapsed, the stabilizing mechanisms it provided disappeared with it.
Without those guardrails, the geopolitical landscape became far more volatile. Regional conflicts intensified, nuclear restrictions weakened, and the possibility of direct confrontation between major powers increased.
The current crisis did not emerge overnight.
It is the result of a long chain of political decisions—decisions that dismantled one of the most significant nuclear control agreements of the twenty-first century.
Notes
- Burak Serim, “Analysis of JCPOA Implementation and Verification Mechanisms,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2022).
- Serim, “JCPOA Implementation and Verification Mechanisms.”
- Dana H. Allin and Jonathan Stevenson, “Predicates and Consequences of the Attack on Iran,” Survival 67, no. 4 (2025): 187–196.
- S. Belal, “Evaluation of Europe’s Efforts to Preserve the JCPOA,” European Foreign Affairs Review (2019).
- Nori Katagiri, “Advanced Persistent Threats and the ‘Big Four’: State-Sponsored Hackers in China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea in 2003–2021,” Comparative Strategy 43, no. 3 (2024): 280–299.
- “Poll: Majority of Americans Oppose War on Iran Without Congressional Approval,” Arab News Releases, January 16, 2026.
- “Americans Overwhelmingly Oppose War with Iran and Say the Trump ‘Hammer’ Strikes Made the US Less Safe,” The Independent, June 23, 2025.
Sources
Allin, Dana H., and Jonathan Stevenson. “Predicates and Consequences of the Attack on Iran.” Survival 67, no. 4 (2025): 187–196.
Belal, S. “Evaluation of Europe’s Efforts to Preserve the JCPOA.” European Foreign Affairs Review, 2019.
Katagiri, Nori. “Advanced Persistent Threats and the ‘Big Four’: State-Sponsored Hackers in China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea in 2003–2021.” Comparative Strategy 43, no. 3 (2024): 280–299.
Serim, Burak. “Analysis of JCPOA Implementation and Verification Mechanisms.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2022.
Arab News Releases. “Poll: Majority of Americans Oppose War on Iran Without Congressional Approval.” January 16, 2026.
The Independent. “Americans Overwhelmingly Oppose War with Iran and Say the Trump ‘Hammer’ Strikes Made the US Less Safe.” June 23, 2025.
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